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Abstract
Background: It is hard to imagine any period in time when economic issues were more visible in
health sector decision-making. The search for measures that maximize available resources has
never been greater than within the present decade. A staff payroll represents 60%-70% of budgeted
health service funds. The cost-effective use of human resources is thus an objective of paramount
importance.
Using incentives and disincentives to direct individuals' energies and behaviour is common practice
in all work settings, of which the health care system is no exception. The range and influence of
economic incentives/disincentives affecting community nurses are the subject of this discussion
paper. The tendency by nurses to disregard, and in many cases, deny a direct impact of economic
incentives/disincentives on their motivation and professional conduct is of particular interest. The
goal of recent research was to determine if economic incentives/disincentives in community nursing
exist, whether they have a perceivable impact and in what areas.
Conclusion: Understanding the value system of community nurses and how they respond to
economic incentives/disincentives facilitates the development of reward systems more likely to be
relevant and strategic. If nurse rewards are to become more effective organizational tools, the data
suggest that future initiatives should:
• Improve nurses' salary/income relativities (e.g. comparable pay/rates);
• Provide just compensation for job-related expenses (e.g. petrol, clothing);
• Introduce promotional opportunities within the clinical area, rewarding skill and competence
development;
• Make available a range of financed rewards.
- Direct (e.g. subsidized education, additional leave, insurance benefits);
- Indirect (e.g. better working conditions, access to professional support network, greater 
participation in decision-making bodies).
Background
The half-life of knowledge in the medical fields is estimat-
ed to be between five and seven years [1,2]. Providers who
do not conscientiously pursue a programme to maintain
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state-of-the-art practice could lose half of their compe-
tence in that period of time. This implies that the informa-
tion base upon which clinical judgements are made is in
constant flux. Similarly, it suggests that health care policy
and interventions must regularly change or adapt in order
to keep up with the pace of scientific advances. Change
and reform in the health sector tend to be imperative and
also the norm.
The health care needs of a given population change over
time, responding to demographic, economic, social, tech-
nological and environmental trends as well as access to
health services, including health education [3,4]. The ex-
tent to which these needs generate a response may often
be a political decision but also reflects the personal moti-
vation of the stakeholders concerned [5].
"The majority of health care interventions in use today are
not proven in terms of efficacy and cost effectiveness. It
has been argued that 10% of health care expenditure dam-
ages patients' health, 10% has no effect on their health
and 80% improves population health. The problem is
that no-one knows which therapies lie in the 10 and 80%
categories!" [6]. The resulting relative vacuum in terms of
demonstrated effectiveness allows for a significant liberty
of action in the health sector, especially among highly au-
tonomous professionals.
There is evidence that considerations other than the pro-
fessional credibility and legitimacy of a given practice are
at play. These may include a wide range of factors such as
clinical experience, financial incentive, access to equip-
ment, risk taking tolerance and other personal preferences
[7]. If health care practices are not selected in terms of ef-
ficacy and cost-effectiveness, what is the basis for
decision-making?
Individuals interacting within a social setting are known
to be subject to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, often
manipulated or managed to strategically meet societal
and/or organizational goals [8,9]. The practice of profes-
sionals, traditionally granted a high degree of autonomy
[10] and working within an environment in constant tran-
sition and changing priorities [11], may be particularly
sensitive or vulnerable to the introduction of incentives
and disincentives, of whatever nature.
There is increasing evidence that the clinical judgement
and professional conduct of physicians are affected by
economic incentives and disincentives [12–16]. There is
very little information however, with regard to the impact
of such measures on nurses [17]. On the contrary, nurses
have been known to express little interest in economic in-
centives/disincentives and disclaim any potential influ-
ence of remuneration strategies on their professional
conduct [18]. A need to verify this perception stimulated
recent research [19].
Methods
There is a recognized scarcity of information on the sub-
ject of economic incentives/disincentives as they relate to
nurses in general, and community nurses in particular. Re-
search questions were developed to direct the investiga-
tion and three major areas of interest were identified:
• What are the economic incentives/disincentives for
community nurses?
• Are community nurses aware of economic incentives/
disincentives?
• What is the impact of economic incentives/disincentives
on nurses?
Perceptions of nurses providing direct care, the nursing
community in general and non-nurse colleagues were
considered of equal importance. A qualitative research
methodology for the generation, collection and analysis
of valid data was developed and implemented. In order to
guarantee a range of different economic policies, includ-
ing remuneration strategies, community nurses and key
informants were interviewed from two research sites (i.e.
London and Geneva) and four employment settings that
applied five different nurse-payment financing systems:
salaried employee in government-financed service; sala-
ried employee in government-financed service but con-
tracted out; salaried employee in government-subsidized
not-for-profit organization; independent practitioner; sal-
aried employee in for-profit agency. A total of 95 individ-
uals provided data; the research methods included
participant observation, individual interviews and focus
groups.
Results and discussion
The research documented a range of remuneration strate-
gies and their effect on nurses' attitudes and behaviour.
The data highlight the presence of two categories of eco-
nomic measures: a) financial incentives involving a mon-
etary payment (e.g. salary, bonus, fee), and b) financed
rewards referring to concessions or privileges that have fi-
nancial implications for the employer (i.e. cost) but no di-
rect monetary payment to the recipient (e.g. subsidized
continuing education, additional leave).
Nurses' attitudes towards and reactions to these economic
measures are presented in this paper. The text ends with a
discussion of what respondents and key informants felt
were significantly valued and socially acceptable econom-
ic incentives likely to positively influence the motivation
and behaviour of community nurses in the future.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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Analysis of the data provided the basis for recommenda-
tions proposing specific reward strategies to be introduced
or reinforced.
The widespread rejection by respondents of an economic
frame of reference as relevant in employment decisions,
professional development, clinical activity and self-image
was noted throughout the research process. The profes-
sion's past and present do not encourage nurses to accept
a definition of their self worth or self image using finan-
cial terms of reference. They are nonetheless sensitive to,
and may be influenced by, a certain range of economic in-
centives/disincentives. This knowledge facilitates the crea-
tion and introduction of more admissible and
strategically powerful motivating factors in the area of
nursing.
Nurses represent the largest category of health workers
and provide 80% of direct patient care [20,21]. Their con-
tribution is not limited, however, to the provision of serv-
ices. Nurses are also effective change agents within the
health sector and society as a whole. Improving the man-
agement and energy focus of such a significant workforce
is possible with suitably targeted economic incentives/dis-
incentives. This would in turn support the implementa-
tion of more viable reforms in the future and enable more
realistic predictions of their outcomes. The data presented
may bring new insights that will strengthen health services
planning and management.
Economic incentives
For the purposes of this paper, an economic incentive is
defined as the payment or concession encouraging effort
in work. An economic disincentive is the absence of ade-
quate payment or concession, or its withdrawal, thus dis-
couraging action or effort in work. The term economic
incentive is used generically to include all staff conces-
sions requiring an investment or allocation of funds.
Financial incentives, are defined as a category of economic
incentives, specifically referring to direct monetary pay-
ment from employer to employee. The attitudes and be-
haviour of salaried employees and professional workers
are acknowledged to be influenced by financial incentives
but also financed rewards (i.e. a concession or privilege
that has financial implications for the employer – cost –
but no direct monetary payment to the recipient). Exam-
ples of these various remuneration strategies are given in
Table 1.
The relevance and impact of economic incentives/disin-
centives vary according to the context and personal value
systems of those involved. Rewards are used as a means of
recruitment and retention of staff [8,9]. Economic incen-
tives have also been demonstrated to influence career
choices as well as priority setting within an assigned list of
duties [7].
Nurses, as a category of workers, have in the past been por-
trayed as less likely to be influenced or interested in finan-
cial gain [5]. Setting aside the traditional image of the
nurse as an angel, volunteer or devoted religious sister,
modern nurses are still described in the professional press
as having an apparent disinterest in monetary rewards:
• "Nursing has never been seen as a financially rewarding
career." [22]
• "A majority [of nurses surveyed] (64.5%) believe nurs-
ing to be a vocation." [23]
• "The entire idea of offering incentives casts an image of
impropriety upon the nursing profession." [24]
• "The dedicated nurses keeping services going are not do-
ing it for the money." [25]
Several nurses in the study confirmed this attitude:
Table 1: Remuneration strategies
Means Examples
Financial incentives
Monetary reward Salary
Merit bonus
Compensation Petrol allowance
Uniform allowance
Financed rewards
Direct Subsidized continuing education
Paid sabbatical leave
Indirect Access to professional support network
Adequate staff/resources in the workplaceHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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Table 2: Nurses' perceptions of incentives and disincentives
Incentive/Disin-
centive
Findings
Salary/Income Salary was not perceived spontaneously as an economic incentive/disincentive and was most often not considered in career 
moves. Exceptions were identified involving jobs offering similar working conditions (e.g. hours) and changes in civil status 
(e.g. married to divorced).
In London, comments on salary relativities were restricted to nursing team members. In Geneva, poor relativities in salary/
hourly rates between nurses and other workers were often highlighted.
It was suggested that the poor salary progression within a given pay grade (comparison of starting and retirement salary) may 
undermine nurses' commitment to their profession as a long-term career.
Clinical grading Clinical grading (career structure) in London was said to perpetuate promotional opportunities in management as opposed 
to clinical nursing and failed to reward individual areas of expertise and professional development. The autonomy required in 
community nursing was, however, recognized in the overall grading resulting in higher pay.
In Geneva, clinical grading recognized the global vision and public health expertise of nurses with post-basic qualifications as 
well as clinical specialities. Clinical grading did not exist for nurses operating within the fee-for-service/fee-for-time system 
and the for-profit setting.
Car access Personal cars were required as a condition of employment. With one exception, car pools had been eliminated as a cost-con-
tainment measure. Recent subsidized public transport was reported in the two public-funded agencies. Allowances for car 
maintenance were granted by one employer although claimed inadequate. The purchase of a car was considered a significant 
personal investment for nurses. Vandalism was also mentioned as a financial disincentive
Petrol A set allowance was provided to compensate for petrol expenses. There was consensus at both research sites that these 
allowances did not cover the total cost.
Parking Parking fees were paid for the salaried nurses, although parking fines most often were not. Parking discs were provided to 
General Practitioners (GPs) but not for nurses.
Uniform/laundry Nurses were no longer required to wear uniforms. Aprons were provided to the salaried nurses, while independent nurses 
could purchase disposable aprons at bulk rate. Several London nurses felt that using personal clothes represented important 
personal initial purchase and ongoing maintenance costs, as their clothing allowance was considered to be inadequate. This 
issue was mentioned only twice by Geneva nurses, although no allowances were provided.
Subsidised cafeteria No subsidized cafeterias were available to nurses in either setting. Although meals represented a significant additional cost (in 
comparison with a hospital setting), this was not spontaneously mentioned by interviewees.
Unsocial hours Shift differentials (i.e. extra pay for working nights and weekends) were considered to be insignificant and not a motivating 
factor in the workplace. There is, however, an indirect economic advantage for community nurses working more regular 
hours with regard to better access and lower fees for child care (mentioned only once).
Overtime Overtime was compensated by time in lieu for salaried nurses and in general did not constitute a major issue. Although not 
strictly overtime, the time spent by independent nurses on indirect care (i.e. liaison duties) was not recognized by the reim-
bursement system and considered a major financial burden as well as concern.
Pension One London respondent mentioned improved pension rights, while another claimed lower benefits. Several salaried Geneva 
nurses noted equal benefits for private and public-sector nurses. Independent nurses were obliged to contribute to the gov-
ernment basic pension scheme.
Cost-of-living London nurses were entitled to cost-of-living increases. The budget freeze applied in Geneva eliminated these automatic 
allowances for salaried nurses. Independent nurses were tariff-dependent and these were not linked to a cost-of-living scale. 
Nurses working for the Swiss for-profit agency did not benefit from cost-of-living increases.
Geographic-specific 
allowances
London nurses benefited from Inner and Outer London Weighting allowances. Such allowances did not exist in the Geneva 
setting.
Bonuses Nurses working at the for-profit agency were entitled to productivity and merit bonuses, although the criteria applied were 
unknown. Salaried (non-profit employer) nurses were eligible for "loyalty" bonuses after 5 years of service. London nurse 
managers received performance-related pay, merit and productivity bonuses, although community nurses did not.
Miscellaneous cash 
disbursements
In addition to the above financial incentives, Geneva salaried (non-profit employer) nurses were granted child support supple-
ments, partial payment of health insurance premiums and an allowance for the purchase of a diary. These incentives were not 
mentioned by nurses from other workplaces.
Staff coverage The London facility was reported to experience chronic staff shortages, high turnover and high absenteeism. In both settings, 
access to temporary nurses was felt to depend on the Area Manager's personal priorities.
Access to supplies 
and equipment
Access to supplies, while considered adequate, was perceived to be more difficult than previously. As a cost-containment 
measure, stocks had been reduced and orders needed to be justified with greater rigour.
Job contracts Although short-term contracts were widely introduced during a certain period as a cost-containment measure, this was no 
longer the practice. The number of part-time jobs was also being reduced. Many of the London nurses were contracted out 
to GP fundholders, their duties largely being determined by contract negotiation.
Access to continuing 
education
All employers were perceived to support continuing education and a lifelong learning approach.
Access to professional 
support
The elimination of Team Leaders was experienced by London nurses as a loss of professional support, while the development 
of the nurse manager hierarchy and the introduction of Clinical Specialists were seen to increase the professional support 
available to Geneva nurses. Respondents, however, were aware of the risk of professional isolation due to the working con-
ditions specific to community nursing.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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• "If they were interested in money, they wouldn't be
here."
• "I don't do it for the money... I don't want money."
• "Nurses didn't come into the profession to focus on
pay."
• "Nurses are not interested in financial reward – they are
basically committed professionals."
• "Nurses don't think in terms of financial incentives."
Nurses' awareness of economic incentives and disincen-
tives in the health sector and how these are perceived are
fundamental areas of interest. A summary of the collected
data is presented in the following section.
Economic incentives and disincentives
Among economic incentives and disincentives, direct
monetary rewards or compensation are the most visible.
Although financial incentives/disincentives were in gener-
al not mentioned spontaneously, questioning did reveal a
range of payments and allocations targeting nurses. Fi-
nanced rewards (direct and indirect) proved to be very rel-
evant to community nurses and are included in the
analysis. Table 2 recapitulates findings in this area. While
the list is not exhaustive, it reflects the discussions held
with respondents and key informants. Nurses working in
other countries/settings may benefit from different specif-
ic incentives (e.g. housing allowance). The proposed clas-
sification of incentives (see above) should however
remain relevant.
Contrary to the widespread initial denial by nurses that
economic incentives exist, the findings highlighted a wide
range of measures. Equally significant however were the
nurses' responses to these incentives once they were iden-
tified and discussed in more detail.
Nurses' perceptions/responses
In general, nurses tended to have four reactions. They
viewed economic incentives/disincentives with indiffer-
ence, positively, negatively or with ambiguity.
Indifference
When asked to name the economic incentives in commu-
nity nursing, almost without exception London interview-
ees spontaneously responded that there were none. While
consistently not perceived as such, salary is a major and
usually the most important financial incentive/disincen-
tive [8,26,27]. The absence of references made to salary is
therefore important as is the complete disassociation ob-
served between basic salary and economic incentive. In an
extreme case, a respondent claimed she got paid but did
not get any financial reward. This supports the theory that
salary may be perceived as a condition of work and not an
incentive [9].
Specific references made to the higher grade classification
of community nurses working in the National Health
Service (NHS) recognizing their greater autonomy (as
compared to hospital nurses) came more frequently from
key informants and/or non-nurses. This may suggest that
nurse managers or individuals from other disciplines per-
ceive salary and economic incentives differently. The fact
that basic pay and grade classification were not men-
tioned by community nurses indicates a certain indiffer-
ence or lack of awareness on their part. The data tended to
support the first option.
Two nurses recognized that private sector hospitals paid
higher salaries and that NHS employment had meant a
decrease in salary (a financial disincentive of approxi-
mately ￿300/month or 30% of a starting salary). Certain
nurses having moved within the NHS reported a lower in-
come in the community as compared with the hospital
and community midwifery. This decrease in revenue was
not only accepted in the career moves made but was not
spontaneously referred to in the interviews. Its absence
again indicates a degree of indifference on the part of
nurses.
While there was agreement among the private salaried
(non-profit employer) nurses that there was no economic
incentive to enter community nursing, there was repeated
reference to the similar job classification and salary with
nurses in the public sector hospital. As in London, the as-
sociation of financial incentive with income in addition
to salary (as opposed to the salary itself) was made.
Geneva nurses repeatedly claimed a disinterest in finan-
cial aspects of their work claiming that salary was not a
priority or part of employment decision-making. They
claimed to be often unaware of salary and benefits before
receiving their first pay check. Many were unable to give
information on their past or present pay details.
With questioning, there was acknowledgement that the
loss of shift differentials (e.g. night duty) when transferred
to the community did represent a reduction in income.
This however was said to be insignificant and not notice-
able. In London, key informants reported that the higher
grade classification of community nurses compensated
for the loss of income from a reduced number of shift
differentials. This could explain the apparent lack of inter-
est in paycheque composition but not the disregard when
considering career moves.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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Nurses in both settings continued to work weekends and
benefit from supplementary payments. London respond-
ents tended not to give value judgements with regard to
weekend differentials while in Geneva, nurses were quite
explicit that the extra pay was not considered a motivating
factor. It can be argued that nurses anxious to benefit from
the supplementary income provided by shift differentials
would not enter community nursing and therefore would
not be among the respondents. No indication from the
key informants however suggested that shift differentials
were a significant motivating factor among nurses in any
setting.
Reported claims for overtime in both settings appeared to
be minimal (except for the Geneva for-profit agency)
while the incidence of working overtime varied greatly ac-
cording to the interviewees. It was said that the infrastruc-
ture in hospitals was better and therefore more likely to
facilitate the claim process. Community nurses tended to
take time unofficially when the team workload permitted.
In most cases, overtime was linked with working through
lunch breaks and often accepted as part of the daily rou-
tine in spite of possible harmful health consequences.
Overtime payment or compensation was a financial in-
centive offered but often not claimed.
Nurses working for the Geneva for-profit agency reported
no economic incentive working in the community al-
though they had received productivitybonuses the preced-
ing year. In addition, they were entitled to merit increases
(as opposed to yearly step increases) but ignored the crite-
ria applied. The productivity and merit bonuses granted
were not considered to have a great impact on nurses' ac-
tivities. Three factors could be significant: a) the recent
creation of the agency, b) the high turnover of staff, and c)
the lack of nurses' awareness with regard to the bonus
criteria.
One employer offered a loyalty bonus for community
nurses after 5 years of service. While it was appreciated, it
was never reported to be a major recruitment or retention
tool.
Applying the classification of economic incentives pre-
sented above, community nurses responded to financial
incentives (i.e. monetary rewards and compensation)
with claimed indifference.
Positive perceptions
Economic incentives welcomed by nurses and thought to
be positive were limited to education-related financed re-
wards. Nurses reported good access to continuing educa-
tion. While there was general appreciation for the
professional development opportunities provided, the
converted Enrolled Nurses (UK) expressed the greatest
benefit claiming to have acquired options for the future.
Considering the imminent redundancy status of many
ENs, this reflects the urgency for higher qualifications to
ensure job eligibility.
Many nurses however felt that despite the employer's sup-
port, the personal investment in further education was
not cost-effective in financial terms but rather a source of
professional growth and satisfaction. Even in the case of
substantial employer subsidies (e.g. 75% of salary provid-
ed by one employer), these measures were not perceived
as financial incentives or a recruitment advantage.
Negative perceptions
Economic incentives need to be considered within the
general remuneration strategy which was felt to be inap-
propriate and "laughable" by one of the focus groups. This
is reflected by the numerous reward measures that are per-
ceived by community nurses as having a negative impact.
Although salary was reported to be unimportant (see
above), relative salary generated a much more emotional
reaction. Geneva nurses repeatedly associated their poor
relative pay with a low societal value given to nursing out-
comes in general and human well-being in particular. Un-
favourable relativities were interpreted as insulting and an
injustice. This would suggest that nurses were more sensi-
tive to the social implications of salary/income than the fi-
nancial gain.
• "I am always insulted that my hourly tariff compares so
badly with other workers."
• "The difference of [payment] with aides is not normal.
Either nurses are not well enough paid or aides are too
well paid. The difference doesn't justify our education, re-
sponsibilities, consequences of care."
• "The hourly increased rate is a small, slight progress. If
compared with the washing machine repairman who bills
CHF 100/hour [as opposed to CHF 64/hour for nurses],
this somehow reflects strange values for the human
being."
Resentment also was expressed by the independent nurses
that much of their work was not recognized and therefore
not remunerated. While some nurses felt exploited and
obliged to subsidize health care, others accepted a volun-
tary participation in the health services provided. Many
however coped with the situation by manipulating the
system thereby creating some ethical dilemmas and/or in-
troducing cynical practices in health care.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
Page 7 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
• "...can get tired of doing volunteer work. Talking 45
minutes with a patient about her anxiety knowing that the
nurse won't be paid gets to be a bit much."
• "We are only paid for what is done in the field by the pa-
tient. All the time spent elsewhere is on us. We give our
time free of charge, subsidizing the health system."
• "Before we did 'arrange' invoices claiming partial baths
with technical care... This was known and accepted as a
practice although the insurance companies didn't know."
All compensation payments were reported to be inade-
quate, in other words not covering the costs incurred by
the community nurses. The resentment was reinforced by
the mandatory nature of the expenses. For example, car
transport was required for carrying out assigned duties but
the reimbursement received was said to be insufficient.
Petrol allowances were felt to be at best a reimbursement
but more frequently a partial payment. These expenses
were considered a financial disincentive. Feelings of ex-
ploitation were also expressed.
Parking represents not only a financial cost but also a
stressful element in the daily life of community nurses.
One nurse felt that parking difficulties could be a reason
to quit practice. The irony of a public employee fining an-
other public employee was not lost to one of the NHS
nurses. Parking fines were considered to be a definite fi-
nancial disincentive in community nursing. Furthermore,
there was ill feeling with regard to the different treatment
reserved for GPs and community nurses visiting the same
patients (i.e. access to parking discs). Again the social im-
plications and value judgements were taken seriously by
the respondents.
Several cases were reported in the press which generated
great protest and indignation. For example, a nurse pro-
viding extended care to a dying patient and his family had
her car clamped and towed although properly identified
as being on official public health business. There was great
protest when it was learned that the nurse had to leave her
wedding ring on deposit to claim back her car [28]; or an-
other case, where a nurse picking up urgent medications
for her patient was delayed for one hour until her car was
liberated having been clamped in front of the pharmacy.
The elimination of uniforms was considered a positive in-
itiative by many nurses who felt safer making home visits
in street clothes. Not being identified as a possible source
of drugs and/or syringes or as part of the establishment
may in certain neighbourhoods be judged a safety meas-
ure for staff. Considering the inadequate clothes allow-
ance provided staff however, this must also be seen as a
cost-saving measure of the employer. The personal cost of
purchasing clothes suitable for professional practice and
their maintenance was reported to be a significant expense
by most nurses and therefore a financial disincentive.
Cleaning costs of street clothes were also higher than the
laundering of uniforms. Highlighted in this example is the
association of an insufficient reimbursement or compen-
sation with the concept of a pejorative value judgement of
the employer. Nurses concluded that the payment was in
fact an insult as well as a financial disincentive. The tone
and content of the interviews suggest that the value judge-
ment was considered more significant.
Although not specifically mentioned, the shift in cost bur-
den from the employer to the employee forced staff to
subsidize the services provided. While it may be argued
that many workers do not get a clothes allowance, the im-
portant distinction made between hospital and commu-
nity nurses must in this case be kept in mind.
One of the economic incentives mentioned frequently by
the respondents was the employer's investment in guaran-
teeing adequate staff coverage. Critical staff shortages were
reported in London while this did not appear to be the
case in Geneva. Responses recorded included low morale,
feelings of resentment and exploitation as well as
frustration.
In both settings, cost-containment measures with regard
to supplies and equipment were felt to decrease the ease of
access and often increase the nurses' workload (e.g. bu-
reaucratic forms, personal responsibility for the delivery
of supplies).
Especially in London, the content, lifespan and negotia-
tion process of job contracts were reported to affect staff's
job security, job description, job location, priority setting,
accountability and professional development. Responses
included demotivation, job insecurity, reduced job satis-
faction and resentment. In both settings however, short-
term contracts were once again being replaced by longer
term contracts thus improving staff's job security and
motivation.
Research has demonstrated that a supportive manager
may reduce the negative effects of a less than desirable en-
vironment [29] while the lack of manager support is per-
ceived as a source of great stress [30]. The risk of
professional isolation was felt keenly by nurses in both
settings. It was more evident in London as nurses were still
dealing with the recent elimination of Team Leaders. The
great sense of abandonment expressed by the nurses
would indicate that access to professional support is a fun-
damental investment employers must consider.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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The existence of bonuses was most relevant in the context
where the target population was management as opposed
to community nurses. Nurses, however, were confronted
with the reality that these bonuses were based on their
productivity while the benefits were not shared with
them. The level of resentment was observed to increase as
the degree of perceived managerial support decreased.
Furthermore, the climate of suspicion created by these bo-
nuses and the perceived lack of information concerning
them is of interest for future personnel managers and pol-
icy makers. Key informants confirmed that management
incentives can at times be seen as staff disincentives.
The concept of nurses doing the best they can ran through
many of the interviews. The possibility of doing better
than "best" if given an economic incentive may be unac-
ceptable to nurses and one of the issues that needs to be
explored.
The perceptions of nurse managers are also of value.
While some felt the incentives produced stress rather than
creativity, others believed the rewards misdirected, chan-
nelling savings/benefits to the greater organization rather
than reinvesting in the responsible unit. The notion of
nurses "doing their best" was echoed in the statement of
nurse managers although conceding that incentives had
had an impact on the direction of their efforts.
• "There are incentives for managers. They help keep me
on track. Not a motivating factor. I am doing the best I
can, but I appreciate the reward once the review period
comes to a close."
• "I came to the job with the attitude I would always try to
do the best possible. In fact, incentives make you focus –
on the employer's and manager's interests. It does work
[but] I don't like the idea that I could do better than best."
More than half of the reward strategies identified in the
study are perceived to have a negative impact on commu-
nity nurses. Of the four types of economic incentives, only
the direct financed reward is absent from this category.
Ambiguous reactions
Several of the reward strategies generated ambiguous reac-
tions. Nurses were not yet sure of the nature of the overall
impact or there was no consensus among the respondents.
There were surprisingly few however. This suggests that al-
though nurses are often reluctant to accept the existence of
economic incentives/disincentives linked to community
nursing, their views on most of the related issues are defi-
nite once the discussion is opened.
While only relevant for London nurses, many respondents
had no knowledge of differences in the allocation of area-
specific allowances within the Trust (Inner/Outer London
weighting). One respondent aware of the financial incen-
tive claimed it had no impact on his career move decision.
This was felt to be the case for community nurses in gen-
eral although contradicted by another source who felt that
nurses transfer worksite in order to benefit from the
allowance.
On the basis of this conflicting information, it is difficult
to conclude that geographic allowances motivate or affect
career choices. Analysis is further complicated as the al-
lowance size differs according to grade and step and may
therefore represent a bigger or smaller factor among other
considerations. The lack of knowledge on the part of nurs-
es as to the potential impact is significant. More research
is needed to determine general tendencies.
A fee-for-service payment system tends to encourage in-
duced demand and/or patient selection (i.e. generating un-
necessary work for personal economic gain and/or
choosing patients that will provide the greatest economic
advantage for the care provider). The potential financial
interest for independent nurses to select patients requiring
higher as opposed to lower paid interventions existed un-
der the past Geneva reimbursement mechanism. While
interviewees acknowledged this possibility and a few cases
were identified, the occurrence was said to be negligible
and eliminated by peer review and pressure. The frequent
references to not wishing to abuse the system implies an
awareness of potential financial incentives in fee-for-serv-
ice and fee-for-time reimbursements.
In Geneva, the adequacy of the salary differences between
clinical grades was questioned. There was doubt that this
financial reward could be considered an incentive for pro-
fessional advancement. Once again, however, an im-
proved social image of the nurse was associated directly
with an increase in grade/salary.
Summary
Table 3 represents an overview of the economic measures
applied and the nurses' responses. The relative relevance
and acceptability of the four types of reward mechanisms
identified is significant for future planning.
By far, the responses generated by economic incentives
tend to be indifference or negative. Only financed rewards,
both direct and indirect, were perceived to be clearly pos-
itive. Financial incentives were never recognized as being
positive and at best were received with ambiguous reac-
tions. Indifference however clearly dominated the record-
ed perceptions of monetary rewards.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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A wide range of economic incentives/disincentives were
identified by nurses once the subject was opened with
gentle questioning. After review of the data, the impres-
sion given is that nurses tend not to express themselves in
financial terms and are often reluctant to admit that mon-
etary reward is of any significance. The insistence of Gene-
va nurses in linking economic reward with societal value
judgements and relative social image suggests the emo-
tional role played by financial incentives in the develop-
ment of personal and professional identity. The frequency
with which nurses felt they were being devalued by the in-
adequacy of the existing economic incentives may have re-
sulted in a rejection of defining themselves or their work
in terms of money. It may be true that "altruism and serv-
ice become a form of self-coercion that makes economic
inequality and asymmetry appear normal, natural and de-
sirable as the badge of professional status" (Turkoski,
quoted in [31]).
Professional pride in the image of nurses doing the very
best possible job may make it impossible to accept the
concept of working harder for financial gain. The
distinction between "token of appreciation" and "moti-
vating factor" may need to be explored with nurses in a fu-
ture study.
Knowledge of nurses' reactions to economic incentives
and disincentives facilitates the creation of positive meas-
ures that will encourage desired behaviours. Looking to-
ward the future, interviewees were asked to identify
economic incentives that would be relevant and likely to
influence their behaviour in the workplace. The next sec-
tion presents an overview of their ideas.
Suggested incentives
Possible economic incentives relevant to nurses and likely
to influence behaviour were explored with interviewees in
both research settings. There was agreement that incen-
tives must come from within the nurses' value systems. Fi-
nancial incentives, as a category of economic incentives,
were mentioned most frequently although investments in
improving working conditions and rewards in kind were
suggested as more meaningful for nurses. As a general
principle, key informants agreed that direct and indirect
economic incentives should exist at comparable levels
with other professions.
In the light of the indifference nurses showed to monetary
payments in the interviews, the number of suggestions re-
lated to financial incentives is surprising. The attention
paid to salary increases was greater than to the salary itself.
This suggests that the relative increase may be significant
rather than the absolute sum of money. While nurses re-
Table 3: Nurses' responses to economic measures
Economic Incentive/Disincentive Indifference Positive Negative Ambiguous
Monetary reward
Salary CH + UK
Relative salary CH + UK
Grade classification CH + UK
Clinical grades
Shift differentials CH + UK CH
Overtime CH + UK
Nurse bonuses CH + UK
Management bonuses CH + UK
Induced demand CH + UK
Area-specific bonuses CH + UK
Compensation
Car CH + UK
Petrol CH + UK
Parking CH + UK
Uniform CH + UK
Financed reward: Direct
Subsidized sabbatical/study leave CH + UK
Tuition CH + UK
Financed reward: Indirect
Staff coverage CH UK
Job contracts (short term) CH + UK
Professional support CH UK
UK = London nurses, CH = Geneva nurses, CH + UK = London and Geneva nursesHuman Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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ferred often to their poor salary relativities (among nurs-
ing personnel and/or other occupations), comparable pay
was never mentioned as a goal for the future.
One source felt incentives were helpful in addressing poor
performance as opposed to motivating excellence. With-
holding incentives was seen as a clear way of indicating to
individuals the need for change. There did not appear to
be consensus however on how nurses perceived financial
reward as a motivating mechanism.
Performance-related pay
Performance-related pay had been introduced in many
sectors of both countries, including the public sector. This
economic incentive generated strong reactions from the
interviewees, leaving no one indifferent. London nurses
having had more experience with performance-related
pay, through management bonuses, considered the possi-
bility in greater detail. In general, performance-related pay
was believed to be inappropriate for nurses and great con-
cern was voiced as to the criteria used for determining suc-
cess. Nurses continued to claim that their interventions
could not easily be measured in a relevant manner
(quality vs. quantity) although standards of practice had
been developed and were applied during clinical audit.
The potential negative impact of performance-related pay
on interpersonal relationships within the nursing and
health teams (e.g. competition) as well as with the patient
was also feared.
At both research sites, interest was expressed in introduc-
ing reverse merit awards or penalties associated with a
yearly evaluation process. Another variation of perform-
ance-related pay provided merit increases for team pro-
ductivity. The point was made however that once the
amount was divided among the team members, the result-
ing reward may be quite small ("peanuts") and not a suf-
ficient financial incentive.
Economic incentives
Besides an increase in basic salary already mentioned
above, the following suggestions were made:
• Improved work environment, e.g. free tea and coffee,
mobile phones
• Educational programmes better focused on nurses'
interests
• Private health insurance or added health benefits
• Social events to improve team spirit
• Rewards in kind, e.g. airline ticket, no taxes
• Choice of incentive, e.g. extra pay vs. extra vacation.
While there was no consensus as to the relevance and
power of financial rewards, nurses in general agreed that
performance-related pay was inappropriate for nursing
care within a social service. It is not difficult to understand
that nurses would be against the introduction of perform-
ance-related pay considering their history. Given their po-
sition within a social or caring sector, there are common
arguments with practitioners from similar disciplines (e.g.
quality vs. quantity indicators, short vs. long time frame,
support vs. product) [32,33]. Nurses were confronted
with the difficulty of predicting the outcomes of nursing
interventions within a given period of time determined by
fiscal considerations. In addition, nurses have been una-
ble to define and clearly articulate what they do thus ham-
pering the identification of relevant performance
indicators. They have consistently been paid unjustly for
their interventions thereby generating distrust of any pay-
ment mechanism. The validity of team (as opposed to in-
dividual) incentives while more acceptable in theory was
questioned because of their probable small size.
Having set no limits on the creation of future incentives,
the modesty of the suggestions was a surprise. In view of
the serious financial disincentives previously mentioned,
the recommendation to improve working conditions by
providing tea and coffee free of charge could appear to be
disproportionate. This may be linked with nurses' self im-
age and frequently noted lack of assertiveness [34]. It also
supports the suggestion that rewards in kind may be more
appropriate for nurses or perceived to be more acceptable
than monetary incentives.
Conclusions
In summary, economic incentives and disincentives exist
in community nursing. Their relevance and impact vary
according to the context and personal value systems of
those involved. The nurses' disassociation of salary and
economic incentive is significant as are the social implica-
tions of relative salaries. Nurses repeatedly claimed that fi-
nancial factors did not enter the employment decision-
making process. Compensation payments (e.g. petrol)
were consistently reported to be inadequate and linked
with unspoken derogatory value judgements (e.g. insult-
ing) applied by the employer and/or society. At the same
time, the nurse was often portrayed as an individual sub-
sidizing the health service.
The adequacy of payment determined to a great extent its
perception as a financial incentive or disincentive. An in-
centive perceived as small or insufficient was often consid-
ered a disincentive. Furthermore, the size of payment was
implied to affect its power as a motivator for action.Human Resources for Health 2003, 1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/1/1/2
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Increases/allowances/payments identified were rarely ac-
knowledged as motivators. The fact that nurse managers
recognized that bonuses did alter their priorities and
methods of work suggests that nurses may be sensitive to
cash payments but that: a) the amounts were not consid-
ered sufficiently important in light of other considera-
tions, or b) it was felt unacceptable to admit financial
temptations.
Bonuses were considered to influence behaviour and atti-
tudes but only when the reward criteria were clearly
known to the recipients. The nurses' acceptance of man-
agement bonuses tended to depend on the direct support
provided by the managers in question. Economic incen-
tives linked to financing conditions of work were seen to
be significant for nurses' daily lives. In general, nurses
were sensitive to efforts to facilitate or impede their work.
Nurses tended not to express themselves in financial
terms, often reluctant to admit that monetary reward was
of any significance. While many nurses recommended a
general increase in salary as the most relevant economic
incentive, as much importance was given to the relative
salary and its impact on social status as to financial gain.
Other suggested economic incentives were modest in na-
ture and may reflect certain personal characteristics of in-
dividuals attracted to nursing.
This study investigated the impression that community
nurses are not affected by economic incentives/disincen-
tives. The data collected tend to refute this prevailing be-
lief. Using incentives and disincentives to direct
individuals' energies thus rewarding desired behaviours is
common practice in many social interactions (between
persons and between groups of persons). This is especially
apparent within work settings and the health care system
is no exception.
Economic incentives/disincentives exist in the health sec-
tor and community nurses are sensitive to their influence.
If nurse rewards are to become more effective organiza-
tional tools, the data suggest that future initiatives should:
• Improve nurses' salary/income relativities (e.g. compa-
rable pay/rates).
• Provide just compensation for job-related expenses (e.g.
petrol, clothing).
• Introduce promotional opportunities within the clinical
area rewarding skill/competency development.
• Make available a range of financed rewards (often con-
sidered more socially acceptable):
- Direct (e.g. subsidized education, additional leave, in-
surance benefits);
- Indirect (e.g. better working conditions, access to profes-
sional support network, greater participation in decision-
making bodies).
If performance-related bonuses are to be successfully im-
plemented in a clinical setting, criteria should clearly cap-
ture qualitative dimensions of care, indicators should be
easily monitored, the rewards must be of a significant na-
ture (e.g. type, monetary value) and the language should
reflect the notion of "appreciation" for work well done as
opposed to "incentive" or "bonus" calling for extra effort.
The widespread resistance to such schemes, increasing ev-
idence of their potential demotivating effect on creative,
professional workers, and the difficulty of measuring
qualitative outcomes in a service sector are however seri-
ous arguments against their introduction.
If we could understand, and could then predict, the ways in
which individuals were motivated we could influence them by
changing the components of that motivation process. Is that
manipulation – or management?
(Handy, 1993, p29–30)
Understanding the value system of community nurses and
how they respond to economic incentives/disincentives
facilitates the development of reward systems likely to be
more relevant and strategic.
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